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Abstract. In this paper we propose an approach for calculating the
most probable root cause for an observed failure in an IT infrastruc-
ture. Our approach is based on Markov Logic Networks. While Markov
Logic supports a special type of deductive inference, known as maximum
a posteriori inference, the computation of the most probable cause re-
quires abductive reasoning. Abduction aims to find an explanation for a
given observation in the light of some background knowledge. In failure
diagnosis, the explanation corresponds to the root cause, the observation
corresponds to the failure of a component or service, and the background
knowledge corresponds to the dependency graph of the infrastructure ex-
tended by potential risks. We apply the method for abduction proposed
by Kate et al. to extend a Markov Logic Network in order to conduct
abductive reasoning [1]. We illustrate that our approach is a well suited
method for root cause analysis by applying it to a sample scenario.
Keywords: Root Cause Analysis, IT Infrastructure, Markov Logic Net-
works, Abductive Reasoning
1 Introduction
Root cause analysis (RCA) plays an important part in processes for problem
solving in many different settings. Its purpose is to find the underlying source
of the observed symptoms of a problem. Especially in IT infrastructures, short
response times to failures (e.g. failing e-mail deliveries, inaccessible websites,
or unresponsive accounting systems) are crucial. Today’s IT infrastructures are
getting increasingly complex with diverse explicit and implicit dependencies.
This makes root cause analysis a time intensive task as the cause for a problem
might be unclear or the most probable cause might not be the most obvious
one. Therefore, automating the process of root cause analysis and helping an IT
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administrative to identify the source of a failure or outage as fast as possible is
important to achieve a high service level.
In this paper we present our approach to root cause analysis that uses Markov
Logic Networks (MLN) and abductive reasoning to enable an engineer to drill
down fast on the source of a problem. Markov Logic Networks provide a formal-
ism that combines logical formulas (to describe dependencies) and probabilities
(to express various possible risks) in a single representation. We focus on abduc-
tive reasoning in MLNs and show how it can be used for the purpose of root cause
analysis. To our knowledge, the proposed approach is a novel method to root
cause analysis that combines probabilistic and logical aspects in a well-founded
framework.
Within our framework, the IT infrastructure is represented as a logical depen-
dency network that includes various threats to its components. When a problem
occurs, available observations are fed into the system which then generates the
Markov Logic Network from the available observations, the given dependency
network, and the general background knowledge related to the components of
the infrastructure. Some of these observations might be specified manually, while
other observations can be fed into the system automatically via constantly run-
ning monitoring software. These observations are typically incomplete in the
sense that not all relevant components are monitored. Thus, taking the given
observations into account, there might still be several explanations for the prob-
lem that occurred.
We calculate, via abduction, the most probable cause for the current problem,
which is then presented to the user, e.g. the administrator of the IT infrastruc-
ture. The user can then investigate if it is indeed the source of the problem. This
might require to manually check the availability of some component or to analyze
a log file. If the proposed explanation is correct, counter-measures can be intro-
duced immediately. If the additional observations revealed that the calculated
explanation is wrong, the new observations are fed into the system as additional
evidence and a better explanation is computed. This iterative, dialogue-based
process is a practicable approach to quickly narrow down on a root cause.
In our approach, we represent the given infrastructure and the possible risks
in first-order logic. This allows us to automatically infer that certain threats are
relevant for certain infrastructure components. Relevant background knowledge
can easily be maintained and used to generate the Markov Logic Network. More-
over, our approach can take into account known probabilities of risks and failures.
These probabilities are derived from expert judgment or statistical data. Instead
of computing multiple candidate explanations, which is possible in purely logic
based approaches, we are able to generate the most probable explanation with
our approach, while still leveraging the full power of an expressive declarative
framework.
This paper is structured as follows. First, we present the theoretical under-
pinnings of our approach. In Section 2, we give a brief description to Markov
Logic, introduce the general notion of abduction, and explain how abduction
can be realized in the context of Markov Logic Networks. In Section 3, we first
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present a typical scenario for root cause analysis. Then, we show how to model
this scenario in our framework and describe how to apply abductive reasoning to
find the most probable root cause. Finally, we present a workflow that illustrates
how our approach is used in the context of a dialogue-based process. We show
how our approach is related to other works in Section 4. Finally, we discuss the
drawbacks and benefits of our approach, and point out some directions for future
work in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
This section first describes Markov Logic Networks. Then we explain abduction
and its concrete implementation in the context of Markov Logic Networks.
2.1 Markov Logic Networks
Markov Logic Networks (MLN) generalize first-order logic and probabilistic
graphical models by allowing hard and soft first-order formulas [2]. Hard for-
mulas are regular first-order formulas, which have to be fulfilled by every inter-
pretation. An interpretation is also referred to as a possible world. Soft formulas
have weights that support (in case of positive weights) or penalize (in case of
negative weights) worlds in which they are satisfied. The probability of a possi-
ble world, one that satisfies all hard formulas, is proportional to the exponential
sum of the weights of the soft formulas that are satisfied in that world. This
corresponds to the common understanding of Markov Networks as log-linear
probabilistic model [2].
An MLN is a template for constructing a Markov Network. A formula is called
a grounded formula if all variables have been replaced by constants. Given a set of
constants, a Markov Network can be generated from the MLN by computing all
possible groundings of the given formulas. Due to the closed world assumption,
the domain of interest consists of only those entities that are defined by specifying
the set of constants. An atom is a formula that consists of a single predicate. A
possible world corresponds to a set of ground atoms, which is usually a small
subset of all possible groundings.
Formally, an MLN L is a set of pairs 〈Fi, wi〉, where Fi is a first-order logic
formula and wi is a real numbered weight [2]. The MLN L, combined with a
finite set of constants C = {c1, c2, ...c|C|}, defines a ground Markov Network
ML,C as follows:
1. ML,C has one binary node for each possible grounding of each pred-
icate in L. The value of the node is 1 if the grounded atom is true
and 0 otherwise.
2. ML,C contains one feature for each possible grounding of each for-
mula Fi in L. The value of this feature is 1 if the formula is true,
and 0 otherwise. The weight of the feature is the wi associated with
Fi in L.
[2, p. 113]
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Generally, a feature can be any real-valued function of the variables of the
network. In this paper we use binary features, essentially making the value of
the function equal to the truth value of the grounded atom.
The description as a log-linear model leads to the following definition for the
probability distribution over possible worlds x for the Markov Network ML,C :
P (X = x) =
1
Z
exp
(∑
i
wini(x)
)
(1)
where Z is a normalization constant and ni(x) is the number of true groundings
of Fi in x.
When describing the MLN we use the format 〈first-order formula,weight〉.
Hard formulas have infinite weights. If the weight is +∞ the formula must always
be true, if the weight is −∞ it must always be false. A soft formula with weight
0 has equal probabilities for being satisfied in a world or not.
There are two types of inference with Markov Logic: maximum a posteriori
(MAP) inference and marginal inference. MAP inference finds the most probable
world given some evidence. Marginal inference computes the posteriori proba-
bility distribution over the values of all variables given some evidence. We are
interested in MAP inference, as we want to determine the world with the most
probable explanation for a failure.
2.2 Abduction in Markov Logic Networks
Abductive reasoning – or simply abduction – is inference to the best explanation.
It is applicable to a wide array of fields in which explanations need to be found
for given observations, for example plan or intent recognition, medical diagno-
sis, criminology, or, as in our approach, root cause analysis. According to [1],
abduction is usually defined as follows [3]:
Given: Background knowledge B and a set of observations O, both formulated
in first-order logic with O being restricted to ground formulae.
Find: A hypothesis H, also a set of logical formulae, such that B ∪H is con-
sistent and B ∪H ` O.
In other words, find a set of assumptions (a hypothesis) that is consistent with
the background knowledge and, combined with it, explains the observation. It is
the opposite of deductive reasoning which infers effects from cause.
The relation between root cause analysis and abductive reasoning is rather
straightforward. In our approach, the background knowledge is the dependency
network, respectively the Markov Logic Network to which we transform it. The
dependency graph and Markov Logic Networks both are based on first-order
logic as a formalism and thus conveniently are already in the desired logical rep-
resentation. The observations, i.e. information about components being available
or unavailable, are not part of the model but rather are directly provided as evi-
dence to the MLN. We then try to prove through abduction that a specific threat
– the most plausible cause – has occurred.
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The inference mechanism in Markov Logic Networks is inherently deductive,
not abductive. Deductive reasoning draws new, logically sound conclusions from
given statements. Kate et al. and Singla et al. [1,4] proposed methods – Pairwise
Constraint (PC) and Hidden Cause (HC) model – that adapt Markov Logic
Networks to automatically perform probabilistic abductive reasoning through its
standard deductive reasoning mechanism. Their method augments the clauses
of the MLN to support abductive reasoning as defined above. In general, the
methods first introduce a reverse implication for every logical implication already
present in the network. For example, if there are formulas p1 → q, . . ., pn → q
in the MLN, the formula q → p1 ∨ . . . ∨ pn is added to the MLN.
In a second step the model is then extended with mutual exclusivity con-
straints that bias the inference against choosing multiple explanations. The re-
verse implications and the mutual exclusivity clauses are modeled as soft rules
and may occasionally be violated, for example, if multiple explanations provide
a better proof for the hypothetical root cause than a single explanation. We
follow this basic idea, however, we argue that the mutual exclusivity constraints
are not required in the application that we are interested in.
3 Root Cause Analysis with Markov Logic Networks
Root cause analysis is the task of finding the underlying cause of an event. It is
often applied to analyze system failures. System failures are commonly caused
by a cascade of events. The goal of a root cause analysis is finding the original
reason for the failure, so that a sustainable solution can be provided [5]. Root
cause analysis typically comprises two phases: the detection of an event and the
diagnosis of the event. In our work, we are concerned with the second phase and
assume that a failure has already been detected.
In this section, we first illustrate the infrastructure of our case study. Af-
terwards, we show how to model dependencies and risks as a set of first-order
formulas. Then, we explain how we implemented abduction in our Markov Logic
Network and show special properties of our settings which simplify the general
approach of abductive reasoning. Finally, we explain how the method is inte-
grated in an iterative process using the example presented at the beginning.
3.1 Scenario Setting
In the subsequent sections we discuss our approach with the help of an infras-
tructure shown partially in Figure 1. This small sample revolving around an
office multifunction printer consists of the following components:
– The basic dependency for all components is the Power Supply. The only risk
that can affect it is a general outage.
– The Network Switch connects the other components. It only depends on the
power supply; it has multiple risks, e.g. congestion, overheating, or denial-
of-service attack, not explicitly depicted in the figure.
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– The two servers mail.uni-ma and cas.uni-am each offer one service, i.e. the
Mail Service and an LDAP authentication service. The Mail Service uses the
LDAP service to authenticate users. Both servers have various threats, e.g.
malicious software, DOS attacks, overloading, or compromise of the system.
– The Office Printer offers three services: Copying, Printing, and Scanning.
It also has various problem sources, e.g. lack of resources or a technical
malfunction.
Copying Service
Printing Service
Scan Service
Office Printer mail.uni-ma
LDAP
cas.uni-ma
Mail Service
Network SwitchPower Supply
Lack of 
Resources 
Lack of 
Resources 
Lack of 
Resources 
Lack of 
Resources 
Lack of 
Resources 
Malicious 
software 
Lack of 
Resources 
Lack of 
Resources 
Systematic 
trying-out of 
passwords
Lack of 
Resources 
Lack of 
Resources 
Misuse of 
spanning tree 
Disruption of 
power supply
Fig. 1. Case Study: Office multifunction printer with risks attached
The threats we are using in our example are defined in the IT-Grundschutz
Catalogues [6, p. 417ff.]:
– Disruption of power supply (T 4.1): Short disruption of the power supply,
more than 10 ms, or voltage spikes can damage IT devices or produce failures
in its operation.
– Failure of Devices or Systems (T 0.25): No equipment runs infinitely and a
hardware failure in an IT device will happen if it runs long enough. Beyond
the damage of the device, the downtime has an effect on the processes that
depend on the device or can even damage other devices, e.g. in the case of a
cooling system.
– Systematic trying-out of passwords (T 5.18): An attacker can gain access
to a system by discovering the password of the system through systematic
trial-and-error.
– Lack of Resources (T 0.27): If the given resources (for example bandwidth,
disk space or personnel) in an area of the operation are smaller than the
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current demand a bottleneck occurs. This results in congestion and failure
of operation.
– Malicious software (T 5.23): Malicious software tries to execute a process
that is unwanted or damaging for the owner of the device that runs the
software. This includes viruses, worms and Trojan horses.
– Misuse of spanning tree (T 5.114): An attacker can use Bridge Protocol Data
Units (BPDUs) to initialize the recalculation of the switch topology. This
can be used to disrupt the availability of the network.
The IT-Grundschutz Catalogues are a comprehensive collection of threats and
safeguards for various parts of an IT infrastructure3. They are created and main-
tained by the German Federal Office for Information Security4, and compatible
to the ISO 27001 certification5.
3.2 Modeling the Infrastructure
The foundation of our root cause analysis is the dependency model. It uses first-
order logic to describe various aspects of the IT infrastructure. Our basic model
uses five predicates:
specificallyDependsOn(x,y) specifies that component x is specifically depen-
dent on component y, e.g. the mail service that runs on the mail server. This
predicate does not allow for any redundancy of y.
genericallyDependsOn(x,y) specifies that component x depends on y. y may
be replaced by some other redundant component. An example is a server
running on the normal power supply or some uninterruptible power source.
redundancy(x,y) states that x and y are redundant and x can replace y.
hasRisk(x,y) assigns the risk y to component x, i.e. y is a threat that endangers
the functionality of a component and it can affect x.
unavailable(x) designates a component x as unavailable, e.g. offline or not
functioning properly.
Formulae 2a to 2f depict the basic MLN program built from those predicates:
〈∀x, y (specificallyDependsOn(x, y) ∧ unavailable(y) ⇒ unavailable(x)),∞〉 (2a)
〈∀x, y (genericallyDependsOn(x, y) ∧ unavailable(y)
∧ ¬∃z (redundancy(y, z) ∧ ¬unavailable(z)) ⇒ unavailable(x)),∞〉 (2b)
〈∀x, y (redundancy(x, y) ⇒ redundancy(x, y)),∞〉 (2c)
〈∀x, y (redundancy(x, y) ∧ redundancy(y, z) ⇒ redundancy(x, z)),∞〉 (2d)
〈∀x, y (affectedByRisk(x, y) ⇒ unavailable(x)),∞〉 (2e)
〈∀x, y ¬(specificallyDependsOn(x, y) ∧ genericallyDependsOn(x, y)),∞〉 (2f)
3 https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Topics/ITGrundschutz/itgrundschutz_node.html
4 Bundesamt fu¨r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
5 http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/management-standards/iso27001.htm
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Formula 2a forbids any world where infrastructure component x is unavail-
able and infrastructure component y is available, if there is a specific dependency
from x to y. Formula 2b is similar to Formula 2a, but for generic dependencies
with redundancies. Provided x is generically dependent on y, y is unavailable,
and there exists no available component z that is redundant with y, then x is
also unavailable. Thus, a component is only available if every specific depen-
dency is available or if at least one redundant component is available for each
generic dependency, respectively. The symmetry and transitivity of redundancy
is modeled by Formulae 2c and 2d. By adding these two formulas, we ensure
that it is not required to specify redundancy for all pairs in both directions. If
we extend an infrastructure with an additional redundant component, we only
need to add a single statement instead of specifying the information for all pairs
in the group of redundant components. Formula 2e enforces that a component
x that is affected by the effects of a risk y becomes unavailable. The predi-
cates specificallyDependsOn(x, y) and genericallyDependsOn(x, y) are mutually
exclusive (Formula 2f).
The known dependencies, risks, and unavailabilities are modeled as evidence
as shown below. Note that these formulas are only two examples for all formulas
required to describe the infrastructure depicted in Figure 1.
〈specificallyDependsOn(MailService,mail.uni-ma),∞〉 (3a)
〈affectedByRisk(mail.uni-ma,MaliciousSoftware),−1.2〉 (3b)
Formula 3a is a hard fact, which states that the MailService depends on the
server mail.uni-ma. The soft Formula 3b encodes that mail.uni-ma can be af-
fected by MaliciousSoftware. This formula has a negative weight, i.e. has a low
probability. As described before, the dependency relation must hold in every
possible world. The soft formula is not fulfilled in most of the worlds. In fact,
if only this evidence is given, the most probable world does not include it, as it
lowers the sum of the weights of all formulas.
Determining the correct weight for the evidence is not trivial. However, there
exist efficient learning algorithms for MLNs [2].
Our basic dependency model only contains relatively simple rules, and only
soft formulas in the evidence. One way in which we extended the MLN program
is by adding additional general knowledge about types of components.
For example, we can add information about the failure rate (in the form of
a weight) of a specific hard drive model to our MLN program.
〈∀x (SCSIHardDrive(x)⇒ affectedByRisk(x ,HeadCrash)),−1.8〉 (4a)
〈SCSIHardDrive(DriveInstance1),∞〉 (4b)
〈SCSIHardDrive(DriveInstance2),∞〉 (4c)
The hard drive model SCSIHardDrive is described as hard drive that has a
certain risk of a head crash (4a). The weight attached to this formula can be
derived from available failure rates. If required we can also add further types
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related to, e.g. the manufacturer of the drive, since it might be known that drives
produced by a certain company have a lower failure rate. We then can model
individual drives as instance of this type (Formulae 4b and 4c). Subsequently,
they inherit all the properties, i.e. the weighted risk of a head crash.
This way, we can build hierarchies of components or threats that facilitate
populating the model with evidence later. Another possible usage is to define
predicates based on location, e.g. that all components in the same building de-
pend on the same power supply. Thus, we do not have to specify all information
explicitly, but leverage the reasoning capabilities of our approach.
3.3 Computing Explanations
We now detail our approach and describe how the Markov Logic Network is
constructed and extended, and how we use abductive reasoning for root cause
analysis. The construction from background knowledge and extension for abduc-
tion of the Markov Logic Network is only done once and does not have to be
changed during the root cause analysis. According to the method proposed in
[1] we have to add one reverse implication for the Formulae 2a, 2b, and 2e:
∀x (unavailable(x) ⇒ (∃y (specificallyDependsOn(x, y) ∧ unavailable(y))) ∨
(∃y (genericallyDependsOn(x, y) ∧ unavailable(y)
∧ ¬∃z (redundancy(y, z) ∧ ¬unavailable(z)))) ∨
(∃y (affectedByRisk(x, y)))
(5)
Additionally, Kate et al.s’ method requires clauses for mutual exclusivity to be
added. The purpose of these clauses is to “explain away” multiple causes for an
observation and prefer a single one [7]. The reverse implications as well as the
mutual exclusivity clauses are usually modeled as soft clauses. In general, for each
set of reverse implications Pi with the same left-hand side, (
|Pi|2+|Pi|
2 ) ∈ O(n2)
mutual exclusivity clauses are added.
However, different from networks in that general method, our approach ex-
hibits a property that simplifies the additional rules needed for abduction: All
the weights in the evidence are negative – based on the reasonable assumption
that threats and risks only occur rarely, i.e. components are available more than
50% of the time. This property allows us to reduce the size of the Markov Logic
Network by leaving out the mutual exclusivity clauses completely: Due to the
reverse implication, the MLN solver has to chose one cause to make the clause
true. However, as all causes have negative weights and thus every cause set to
true is lowering the sum of the weights of a possible world, the solver is already
biased against choosing multiple explanations. This saves us from generating the
quadratic number of mutual exclusivity clauses.
After constructing and extending the Markov Logic Network, we can conduct
the root cause analysis. The overall process flow of our approach is depicted in
Figure 2. The analysis is a dialog-based and iterative process, with interaction
between our system and an administrative user. A fully automatic workflow is de-
sirable, however, not every information can be retrieved directly and sometimes
manual investigation of log files or on the status of components is necessary.
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Fig. 2. Process flow for our approach on root cause analysis. Rectangles denote auto-
matic action. Trapezoids require manual interaction by an administrative user.
In its normal state, without any hard evidence about availabilities or unavail-
abilities, all components are assumed to be available. Thus, when calculating the
MAP state, it contains all components as available. When a problem occurs the
user is required to provide observations as evidence for the MLN (1). These
observations include any certain information about available and unavailable
components. For example, the user can enter that printing over the network is
not possible, although the network is functional as browsing the internet still
works. This results in hard evidence for the printing service being unavailable
and network services and hardware required for internet access being available.
Our approach extends the Markov Logic Network with the new evidence
(2) and uses an MLN solver to run MAP inference on it (3). The calculated
MAP state contains the evidence provided by the user (this must be always
fulfilled), components being unavailable due to a direct or indirect dependency
on components observed as not available, and (at least) one root cause that
explains the unavailabilities. Components which are not affected by specified
observations or the calculated root cause are listed as available.
The root cause fulfills the following properties:
– It explains all unavailabilities in the evidence. This is the case due to the
additional reverse implications.
– It is not affecting any component stated as available in the evidence. Other-
wise a hard rule would be violated.
– It is the most probable cause for all the observations given as evidence and
the risk probabilities specified as weights.
We make the assumption that all causes are unlikely (they appear less than 50%
of the time). Thus, their weights are negative. As the objective of the MAP state
is maximizing the sum of all weights, only the most likely cause that explains all
observations is included. A less likely cause has a higher negative weight, causing
the sum of the weights to be lower than optimal, and thus getting rejected.
Our approach only presents multiple possible root causes, if the sum of their
weights is less than the weight of a single possible cause. If there are two possible
root causes with the same weight, only one is presented at random.
The user then has to investigate the presented root cause (5). If it is the
source of the observed problem, the analysis is finished and the cause can be
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fixed. Otherwise the process starts over from (1) where the user enters additional
observations. Those new observations can either be gathered while investigat-
ing the proposed root cause, or, for example, the user can verify the state of
components that should also be affected by this cause.
3.4 Scenario Analysis
The following section describes the application of our approach to two different
scenarios. These two scenarios illustrate failures that occurred in our IT infras-
tructure during the last months. Together with our system administrators, we
modeled our infrastructure, analyzed these scenarios in hindsight, and tested
the usefulness of our approach in retrospective. We used RockIt [8], a highly
optimized and scalable MLN solver, to compute the MAP state.
The first scenario is the one depicted in Figure 1, revolving around the mal-
function of our office multifunction printer. The printer offers three services:
copying, printing via the network, and scanning to PDF which is then sent to an
email address. A user reported the printer being broken, as scanning to PDF no
longer worked. To check the proper functioning of the device, the administrator
sent a print job and did a photo copy. Both tests worked successfully. Sending
a test mail from his own account, the administrator also found the mail ser-
vice working correctly. Further investigation finally revealed that the root cause
of the scanning problem was a suspension of the account the printer used for
the LDAP authentication. However, this cause was only considered after several
discussions with two expert administrators involved.
We applied our approach to this scenario. The MLN was constructed au-
tomatically from the background knowledge that we maintained as a set of
first-order formulas. We fed in the observations available(PrintService), avail-
able(CopyService), and ¬available(ScanService) and computed the most proba-
ble root cause. The MAP state that was generated as solution contained the root
cause affectedByRisk(cas.uni-ma, Systematic trying-out of passwords). While we
could not definitely decide, in retrospective, if this risk was the underlying rea-
son for the failure of the server cas.uni-ma, an authentication problem related
to cas.uni-ma was definitely the cause for the problem.
The second scenario is an outage of our internal subversion server. It involves
more components than the previous scenario and benefits from the iterative ap-
proach. The subversion server is hosted on a virtual machine that is running on a
blade server. Subversion was responding slowly and took long time for many op-
erations. Neither Subversion nor other processes on the virtual machine showed
considerable resource utilization. Investigating resource usage on the blade server
first did not reveal any abnormality. Later, a user discovered that our external
website behaved similarly in performance as the SVN. This observation was first
attributed to a slow internet connection in general, but we then discovered that
the web server, which was hosted in a different VM but on the same blade server,
produced very high network traffic, starving all other services. A member of our
group had released a data set of several gigabytes in size, that was downloaded
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a few hundred times concurrently. That lead to congestion on the network inter-
face of the server. Moving the download to another physical server resolved the
problem and the behavior of the subversion server and our website went back to
normal.
Analyzing this scenario with our approach, first, we only entered the obser-
vation of the unavailability of the SVN service: ¬available(Service Subversion).
The computed MAP state proposed affectedByRisk(VM Subversion, Overload)
as root cause. After ruling out this cause by adding available(VM Subversion)
and the observation ¬available(Service WebHosting), the result of the compu-
tation was affectedByRisk(NetworkInterface BladeServer, Congestion) as root
cause. This risk has a high probability for that server which is running various
other virtual machines, all hosting services sensitive to a high network load. The
lack of other resources, e.g. CPU or RAM, is modeled as less probable, because
all those services are usually not very computational complex or requiring lots of
memory. For this scenario, our approach proposed reasonable root causes which
we retrospectively could verify as the reason for the outage. The manual han-
dling of the incident involved more guesswork by the system administrators and
was long winded.
4 Related Work
Related work can roughly be divided into two parts: Approaches also conducting
root cause analysis, but using a different method; and approaches using proba-
bilistic frameworks for abductive reasoning, yet not in the context of root cause
analysis.
4.1 Root Cause Analysis
In previous work, failure diagnosis is conducted using correlation measures. A
specific correlation measure for failure diagnosis is presented in [9]. The approach
uses anomalies in the timing of program calls to trace the real root cause of an
event. The anomalies are aggregated to give an anomaly score for each compo-
nent. The scores are correlated within their architectural level to determine an
anomaly ranking, which expresses the likelihood that a component is the root
cause of a failure. A method for failure diagnosis using decision trees is proposed
in [10]. The decision tree classifies the successful as well as failed requests. A
correlation of paths in the decision tree with occurred failures indicates the node
that represents the likely root cause.
In [11] an approach for requirements-driven root cause analysis for failures
in software systems is proposed, wherein a Markov Logic Network is used as
knowledge repository for diagnostic knowledge. The approach uses log data as
observation information, the Markov Logic Network is used to deal with un-
certainty stemming from incomplete log data. Their approach differs from ours
in several points: they first model the background knowledge as goal trees and
only convert it to first-order logic later; the evidence is solely generated from
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log data; and most importantly they use marginal inference, different to our
approach which uses MAP inference. In [12] marginal inference was also used
for the purpose of estimating unavailabilities in an IT infrastructure, where the
authors referred to problems when marginal inference is applied to very low
probabilities usually attached to the occurrence of risks in an IT setting. These
problems are based on the use of sampling algorithms for performing marginal
inference. Our approach is based on solving an optimization problem, which is
not affected negatively by very small probabilities.
The Shrink tool [13] uses a Bayesian Network to model the diagnosis prob-
lem. It extends previous work on fault diagnosis with Bayesian Networks [14], by
proposing a greedy inference algorithm with polynomial running time. Further-
more, Shrink is able to handle noise and small inaccuracies in the observations.
4.2 Applications of Abductive Reasoning
In [4], Singla et al. extend the approach presented in [1] and use it in the context
of plan and intent recognition. Instead of adding reverse implication, they intro-
duce a hidden cause for all implications with the same left-hand side. In general,
this reduces the size of the MLN and subsequently increases performance. How-
ever, as detailed above, for our approach the mutual exclusivity clauses are not
needed anyway. Nonetheless, if more probable events have to be included in the
evidence, their optimization can also be included in our approach.
Most other approaches to abductive reasoning either use first-order logic
to calculate a minimal set of assumptions sufficient to explain the hypothesis
[15,16,17,18], or Bayesian Networks to compute the posterior probability of al-
ternative explanations given the observations [7]. The former approaches are
not able to estimate the likelihood of alternative explanations, as they do not
support uncertainty in the background knowledge or evidence. Bayesian Net-
works, on the other hand, are designed to handle uncertainty. However, as they
are propositional in nature, they cannot handle structured knowledge involving
relations amongst multiple entities directly [1].
Bayesian Abductive Logic Programs (BALP) [19] are another approach that
combines first-order logic and probabilistic graphical models. The main differ-
ence to MLNs is that BALPs are based on Bayesian Networks, which are di-
rected. Undirected relations, like the symmetry of redundancy, are thus more
complex to model. In [20], Inoue et al. describe a system that uses integer linear
programming (ILP) for weighted abduction. They outperform a state-of-the-art
abductive engine6. The MLN solver we use also transforms the problem inter-
nally to an ILP, which is one of the reasons for its good runtime performance.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
We presented our approach of applying abductive reasoning using Markov Logic
Networks to compute the most probable root cause for a failure in an IT in-
6 Mini-Tacitus: http://www.rutumulkar.com/tacitus.html
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frastructure. Our approach models the infrastructure with the help of first-order
logic. In particular, we formulated the dependencies of the network as hard for-
mulas. Moreover, we added weighted soft formulas to model the probability of
risks that might result in the failure of components and services. We defined
these risks in accordance to the taxonomy of the IT Grundschutz Catalogues.
Furthermore, we have argued how the expressiveness of first-order logic can be
used to model general, reusable knowledge concerning risks and IT components.
Our approach uses the same formalism for both knowledge presentation and
abductive reasoning. Thus, all relevant information is readily available to com-
pute the most probable root cause once an incident occurs. To the best of our
knowledge, there exists no other approach that combines uncertainty and logical
abductive reasoning to solve the problem of root cause analysis.
We conducted an evaluation of our approach by analyzing two failures that
happened in the infrastructure of our research group. In both cases we were able
to determine a root cause (respectively, a sequence of probable root causes) that
turned out to be helpful for a system administrator to resolve the problem. Our
approach is especially useful when the reasons for the failure are not obvious to
the administrator that is in charge of resolving the problem. Thus, our approach
will be more beneficial in IT infrastructures, where competences are scattered
over the members of different organizational units.
We did not conduct an evaluation of the scalability of our approach. However,
the MLN solver RockIt, which we used, was extensively tested in other complex,
large scale settings and showed good performance for MLNs with several hundred
formulas and tens of thousands of facts in the evidence [8,21].
So far, we have not taken all risks of the Grundschutz Catalogues into ac-
count. Instead, we have focused on a subset relevant for the infrastructure we
modeled. To apply our approach to an arbitrary IT infrastructure, we have to
create a complete translation of the catalogues to our logical representation.
Further, we plan to implement a user interface that presents the computed root
cause in a comprehensive way and allows to specify observations without the
need for understanding the underlying formalism. Currently, the user has to
model all observations as logical formulas. Once we set up such an interface, we
are able to study performance, acceptance, and benefits of the approach in a
field study where the complete system is used in the daily work of a computer
center.
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